The Albanese government came to power promising a refresh and a rethink of Australia’s international policy. In just under 15 months in office, this has manifested in three major reviews across the main domains of Australian statecraft: the defence strategic review (released in April 2023), the new international development policy (released this week) and the diplomatic capability review (finalised in May).
While the new defence and development policies both have public versions — released to significant fanfare and generating a tide of analysis — the diplomatic capability review has remained internal to DFAT and barely acknowledged.
In May, The Australian and The Guardian reported on the review’s key findings based on copies obtained by those mastheads, focusing on the gaps in Australia’s diplomatic capacities.
At senate estimates in June, however, DFAT secretary Jan Adams said the capability review was undertaken as an internal management tool and was not intended for full public release.
It is regrettable — but also not surprising, given DFAT’s risk aversion — that the decision was made to keep the diplomatic review under wraps. The irony, however, is that the review is effectively already in the public domain, with copies evidently circulating in the press gallery.
Moreover, there is unlikely to be a national security case for keeping this document for official eyes only given that it was guided by external parties (Allan Gyngell, Christine Holgate and Andrew Colvin) and goes to the practice and institutions of diplomacy, rather than the substantive content of Australia’s foreign policy. It is hard to see why the national interest is better served by secrecy in this instance.
In fact, there is a compelling public interest in releasing the capability review.
Foremost, this is about accountability. Given the seriousness of the findings about Australia’s diplomatic deficit, the government and DFAT need to be publicly accountable for implementing the review’s recommendations.
This is especially important for a government that has made such strong rhetorical commitments about the primacy of diplomacy and rebuilding DFAT’s capability. Australians want their diplomats to be effective, so they deserve to know what DFAT is doing to ensure that is the case.
For its part, DFAT should welcome this kind of external accountability. The department has proven itself ineffective at advocating for even modest boosts to its resourcing for the better part of two decades, even while defence and security counterparts continue to receive enormous boosts.
Diplomacy does not have a discrete external constituency to advocate on its behalf, unlike the development and defence sectors, so some public pressure stimulated by the review’s findings might be the best thing to happen to DFAT’s balance sheet in some time.
With the defence and development reviews now public, diplomacy is the obvious missing piece. Moreover, as Australia aspires to better-integrated statecraft, these reviews and their recommendations are interdependent. Australia’s diplomacy is the indispensable infrastructure through which much of the substantive policy in the defence and development reviews will be enacted.
Indeed, the new international development policy recognises that “[t]o deliver an effective development program, we must invest in the people who will deliver it, and value their skills and experience”.
Similarly, the defence strategic review recommends that DFAT “be appropriately resourced to lead a nationally determined and strategically directed whole-of-government statecraft effort in the Indo-Pacific”. But with the diplomatic capability review shielded from view, Australians are not able to see the full picture of how their government plans to enact its international policy.
Publishing the capability review would also be an act of good faith. Commentators on Australian foreign policy (present company included) can at times be witheringly critical of Australian foreign policy and the institution of DFAT. But it ultimately comes from a place of goodwill and respect.
We know Australian diplomacy is too vital to our nation’s future to let it lie in malaise. We want DFAT to be the best possible version of itself — and we offer critical but constructive commentary in that light. Being able to see the diplomatic capability review would unlock a trove of external expertise to share advice and pitch in to assist its implementation.
When questioned by the shadow foreign minister, Simon Birmingham, in senate estimates, secretary Adams was clearly frustrated that the media coverage “quote[d] selectively from and slightly takes out of context” the capability review as a whole. Surely the best response then is to let the Australian public make their own judgement by letting them read the document for themselves.
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